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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 David George Husmann placed various images of 
child pornography in a shared computer folder connected to a 
file sharing network. Based on that conduct, a jury convicted 
him of three counts of distributing child pornography. At trial, 
the government did not present evidence that any person had 
actually downloaded or obtained the materials that Husmann 
made available. The issue we address is whether the mere act 
of placing child pornography materials in a shared computer 
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folder, available to other users of a file sharing network, 
constitutes distribution of child pornography. We conclude it 
does not. A conviction for distributing child pornography 
cannot be sustained without evidence that another person 
actually downloaded or obtained the images stored in the 
shared folder. Accordingly, we vacate Husmann’s conviction 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) and remand for resentencing.  
 
I. 
 
A. 
 
While Husmann was on supervised release for a child 
pornography conviction, the U.S. Probation Office received a 
software alert indicating that his computer had accessed 
pornographic websites and images. In response to the alert, 
U.S. Probation Officer Stephen Carmichael visited 
Husmann’s residence. Carmichael found Husmann in the act 
of viewing a still image of a young girl between six and eight 
years old posed in a bathing suit. Carmichael thought this 
image originated from a flash drive in the USB port of 
Husmann’s DVD player. Carmichael seized that drive and 
three other flash drives.  
 
Carmichael found pornographic images on the flash 
drives and referred the case to the FBI for investigation. After 
obtaining a search warrant, FBI agents searched Husmann’s 
home. They seized several computers and computer-related 
items. They also questioned Husmann, who admitted to 
downloading, saving, and viewing all of the images stored on 
the flash drives that Carmichael had seized over a month 
earlier.  
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FBI Agent Donald Price subsequently reviewed the 
evidence seized from Husmann’s home. He found over 4,000 
images of child erotica. Of these images, the government 
identified approximately 65 still images and one hour-long 
movie as child pornography. Price also found two file sharing 
programs installed on Husmann’s computer, Limewire and 
360 Share Pro.  
 
File sharing programs, also known as peer-to-peer file 
sharing programs, enable computer users to share and receive 
electronic files, including images, videos, and audio files, 
with a network of other users. To exchange files, users’ 
computers communicate directly with each other, rather than 
through central servers. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios 
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919-20 (2005). Program 
users can search for files made available by other users, 
browse files made available by a specific user, and download 
files. See United States v. Chiaradio , 684 F.3d 265, 271 (1st 
Cir. 2012) (discussing the features of file sharing programs). 
Program users can also make their files accessible to others 
by placing their files in a designated folder that is available to 
the network of program users. See id. Since communications 
take place between computers connected to the file sharing 
network and do not travel through a central server, see Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 545 U.S. at 920, placing files into a 
shared folder does not automatically transmit them to another 
computer; shared files do not leave a user’s computer until 
another program user actually downloads them.  
 
360 Share Pro maintains an extensive log file that 
details what materials a user has made available for sharing. 
Agent Price’s review of the log file in this case revealed that 
child pornography files were placed in a shared folder on 360 
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Share Pro, allowing others access to the files on several dates. 
However, Price could not identify when these files were 
loaded to the shared folder nor could he determine if the files 
were “ever downloaded to another machine.” App. 202.  
B. 
 
Following the government’s investigation, a federal 
grand jury returned a seven-count indictment. Counts One 
through Three alleged that Husmann knowingly distributed 
child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2). 
Counts Four through Six alleged that Husmann knowingly 
received child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
2252(a)(2). Finally, Count Seven alleged that Husmann 
knowingly possessed child pornography, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).  
 
 The case proceeded to trial. On the first day of trial, 
the government voluntarily dismissed Counts Four through 
Six, which charged Husmann with knowingly receiving child 
pornography. At the close of the government’s case, 
Husmann moved to dismiss the remaining charges pursuant to 
Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. He 
argued that the government’s evidence was insufficient to 
establish that he was the person who uploaded the files in 
question, since the four other people who lived with him had 
easy access to the computer and flash drive at issue. The 
District Court denied the motion and called for the defense’s 
case. Thereafter, the jury found Husmann guilty of three 
counts of distribution and one count of possession of child 
pornography.  
 
Before sentencing, the Probation Department 
submitted a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), which 
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identified Husmann’s base offense level as 22. The PSR 
proposed several enhancements under § 2G2.2 of the 
Sentencing Guidelines and calculated Husmann’s Adjusted 
Offense Level as 37. The report stated that, based on an 
offense level of 37 and a criminal history category of III, 
Husmann’s guideline sentence ranged from 262 to 327 
months. The government later filed a sentencing 
memorandum. The government agreed with virtually all of 
the enhancements proposed by Probation except that it 
recommended a two-level, instead of four-level, enhancement 
for the number of child pornography images in Husmann’s 
inventory.  
 
 The District Court subsequently conducted a 
sentencing hearing. The Court declined to apply a two-level 
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(6) for the use of a 
computer, since virtually all child pornography offenders use 
computers. Additionally, the District Court adopted the 
government’s proposal to apply a two-level enhancement for 
the number of child pornography images in Husmann’s 
collection. After imposing the other enhancements, 
Husmann’s total offense level became 33, with a 
corresponding guideline range of 168-210 months. 
Ultimately, the District Court sentenced Husmann to a 240-
month term of incarceration on each count, to be served 
concurrently. Husmann appealed.1 
                                                 
1 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over this 
case under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
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II. 
 
This appeal turns on an issue of statutory construction, 
namely whether placing child pornography materials in a 
shared folder available to other users of a file sharing network 
constitutes “distribution” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252(a)(2). Husmann argues that the District Court erred in 
denying his Rule 29 motion for acquittal with respect to the 
distribution counts because the government presented no 
evidence that anyone accessed, viewed, or downloaded files 
from his shared folder. He asserts that placing child 
pornography in a shared folder, without anything more, does 
not amount to distribution under § 2252(a)(2). The 
government, on the other hand, contends that “‘distribution’ 
within the meaning of the statute should be defined as 
encompassing the act of sharing a file on a file sharing 
service, by making it available to all other users.” Gov’t Br. 
20.  
 
Husmann also argues that the District Court committed 
several errors at sentencing. He claims that the District Court 
erred when it identified his prior conviction for possession of 
child pornography as a predicate offense for a five-level 
sentencing enhancement. Additionally, he argues that the 
District Court’s imposition of a 240-month term of 
imprisonment was procedurally and substantively 
unreasonable.2  
                                                 
2 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(a) provides that “the 
court on the defendant’s motion must enter a judgment of 
acquittal of any offense for which the evidence is insufficient 
to sustain a conviction.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a). Before the 
District Court, Husmann did not present a legal argument 
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A. 
 
 Turning to Husmann’s statute of conviction, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252(a)(2) provides that:  
Any person who . . . (2) knowingly receives, or 
distributes, any visual depiction using any 
means or facility of interstate or foreign 
commerce . . . by any means including by 
computer . . . if—(A) the producing of such 
visual depiction involves the use of a minor 
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and (B) 
such visual depiction is of such conduct . . . 
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) 
of this section. 
 Because the statute does not define the term 
“distribute,” “we construe it in accordance with its ordinary 
                                                                                                             
regarding the meaning of “distribute” in § 2252(a)(2). 
Therefore, we exercise plain error review. See Puckett v. 
United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134-35 (2009). To establish 
plain error, an appellant must demonstrate that: “(1) there was 
an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious; and (3) the error 
affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the 
ordinary case means it affected the outcome of the district 
court proceedings.” United States v. Andrews, 681 F.3d 509, 
517 (3d Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted). If these three 
conditions are satisfied, “an appellate court may then exercise 
its discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if . . . the 
error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public 
reputation of the judicial proceedings.” Id. (alterations in 
original) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 
467 (1997)).   
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meaning.” See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & 
Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014) (quotation marks 
and brackets omitted). We look to dictionary definitions to 
determine the ordinary meaning of a word. See United States 
v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 288, 294 (3d Cir. 2008). It is well settled, 
however, that a “word must not be read in isolation but 
instead defined by reference to its statutory context.” Ali v. 
Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 234 (2008). After all, 
“[a] word in a statute may or may not extend to the outer 
limits of its definitional possibilities. Interpretation of a word 
or phrase depends upon reading the whole statutory text, 
considering the purpose and context of the statute, and 
consulting any precedents or authorities that inform the 
analysis.” Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 486 
(2006). Therefore, to determine the meaning of “distribute” in 
§ 2252(a)(2), we consider definitions of the term, the 
statutory context, and the case law. 
 
 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “distribute” as: “[t]o 
apportion; to divide among several” and “[t]o deliver.” 
Black’s Law Dictionary 487 (9th ed. 2009). Merriam-Webster 
provides the following definitions, among others, for the term 
“distribute”: “to divide among several or many” and “to give 
out or deliver especially to members of a group.” See 
Distribute Definition, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, available 
at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/distribute. We 
find additional guidance in the definition of “distribute” set 
forth in the controlled substances context. Under the Model 
Criminal Jury Instructions for the Third Circuit, to distribute a 
controlled substance means “(to deliver or to transfer) 
possession or control of a controlled substance from one 
person to another.” Model Criminal Jury Instructions for the 
Third Circuit § 6.21.841-2 (2014); see also 21 U.S.C. § 
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802(11) (providing that “‘distribute’ means to deliver” for 
purposes of drug offenses).  
 
 The statutory context confirms that “distribute” in § 
2252(a)(2) means to apportion, give out, or deliver and that 
distribution necessarily involves the transfer of materials to 
another person. Significantly, Congress legislated specific 
prohibitions against offering and promoting child 
pornography within the same statutory scheme as it 
prohibited distributing child pornography. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2251(d)(1)(A) (prohibiting offers to distribute child 
pornography); 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (prohibiting the 
advertisement and promotion of child pornography); see also 
United States v. Sewell, 513 F.3d 820, 822 (8th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that placing images of child pornography in a shared 
folder on a peer-to-peer file sharing program was “clearly an 
offer to distribute the file,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
2551(d)(1)(A)). Congress also penalized the attempted 
distribution of child pornography through specific statutory 
provisions. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(b)(1), 2252A(b)(1). 
Because Congress has separately criminalized offering, 
promoting, and attempting to distribute child pornography, a 
broad definition of the term “distribute” would create 
unnecessary surplussage. To give effect to the entire statutory 
scheme, “distribute” must require the transfer of possession of 
child pornography to another person.  
 
 The decisions of our sister circuits provide support for 
our construction of the term “distribute.”3 Several circuits 
                                                 
3 Cases addressing child pornography distribution convictions 
arise under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) as well as 18 U.S.C. § 
2252A(a). Both provisions prohibit the distribution of child 
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have made clear that distribution occurs when pornographic 
materials are actually transferred to or downloaded by another 
person. The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Budziak held 
that “the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction for 
distribution under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) when it shows that 
the defendant maintained child pornography in a shared 
folder, knew that doing so would allow others to download it, 
and another person actually downloaded it.” 697 F.3d 1105, 
1109 (9th Cir. 2012). Similarly, the First Circuit in Chiaradio 
explained that distribution occurs “[w]hen an individual 
consciously makes files available for others to take and those 
files are in fact taken.” 684 F.3d at 282 (emphasis added); see 
also United States v. Shaffer, 472 F.3d 1219, 1223 (10th Cir. 
2007) (“We have little difficulty in concluding that [the 
defendant] distributed child pornography in the sense of 
having ‘delivered,’ ‘transferred,’ ‘dispersed,’ or ‘dispensed’ it 
to others.”).  
 
 Moreover, numerous courts have noted the fact of a 
file transfer or download when affirming child pornography 
distribution convictions under § 2252. See, e.g., United States 
v. Richardson, 713 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 2013) (upholding a 
distribution conviction where a law enforcement officer 
“actually downloaded” a child pornography video stored in 
the defendant’s shared folder); Budziak, 697 F.3d at 1109 
(affirming a distribution conviction, where FBI “agents 
actually downloaded shared files containing child 
pornography from an IP address registered to” the defendant); 
Chiaradio, 684 F.3d at 282 (upholding a distribution 
conviction because a “rational jury could conclude . . . that 
                                                                                                             
pornography and are materially the same for purposes of the 
issue before us.  
  12 
the defendant intentionally made his files available for the 
taking and that [the agent] simply took him up on his offer”); 
Shaffer, 472 F.3d at 1224 (affirming a conviction for 
distribution of child pornography based, in part, on the fact 
that an agent was able to download child pornography from 
the defendant’s shared folder); see also United States v. 
Abraham, No. 05-344, 2006 WL 3052702, at *8 (W.D. Pa. 
Oct. 19, 2006) (holding that “the defendant distributed a 
visual depiction when as a result of the defendant’s 
installation of an internet peer-to-peer video file sharing 
program on his computer, a Pennsylvania state trooper was 
able to download the child pornography from the defendant’s 
computer to the trooper’s computer”). 
 
 The dissent contends that we have “missapplie[d] the 
need for a download to create distribution, where other 
factual bases have greater merit in interpreting the definition.” 
Dissent Op. at 10. Yet no such ranking system is evident 
within decisions addressing child pornography distribution 
convictions. Additionally, the dissent quotes from Shaffer and 
other cases to suggest that merely making files accessible to 
others is sufficient to constitute distribution of child 
pornography. That is not so. In Shaffer, it was undisputed that 
the defendant’s child pornography had been downloaded by 
other individuals, but the defendant argued that he was not 
guilty of distribution because he did not take any affirmative 
steps to transfer possession of those materials. The Tenth 
Circuit in Shaffer rejected the defendant’s argument, 
explaining that the defendant “distributed child pornography 
in the sense of having ‘delivered,’ ‘transferred,’ ‘dispersed,’ 
or ‘dispensed’ it to others” because he “freely allowed 
[agents] access to his computerized stash of images and 
videos” and an agent “had no trouble whatsoever picking and 
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choosing for download images and videos from [the 
defendant’s] child pornography collection.” 472 F.3d at 1223-
24. To be clear, no circuit has held that a defendant can be 
convicted of distribution under § 2252 in the absence of a 
download or transfer of materials by another person.  
 
 Notably, military courts interpreting § 2252 have held 
that the term “distribute” requires evidence of an actual 
download or transfer of materials. See United States v. 
Gorski, 71 M.J. 729, 734 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2012) 
(“[D]istribution of child pornography files requires the files to 
have been transferred or delivered to the possession of 
another via peer-to-peer file-sharing software programs.” 
(emphasis added)); United States v. Craig, 67 M.J. 742, 746 
(N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2011) (declining “to include 
incomplete transfers of possession within the meaning of 
‘distribute’ as it relates to child pornography”). In Gorski and 
Craig, the courts rejected the defendants’ guilty pleas to 
distribution of child pornography because there was no 
evidence that another person actually downloaded the 
materials at issue. See Gorski, 71 M.J. at 736 (rejecting the 
guilty plea to distribution because the defendant’s “actions in 
merely making files available for download via peer-to-peer 
file-sharing software programs cannot amount to distribution 
as a matter of law”); Craig, 67 M.J. at 746 (holding that the 
guilty plea was “improvident because it [wa]s supported only 
by facts that the images and videos were made available” and 
there was no evidence of “a completed transfer of possession 
of the contraband”). 
B. 
 
 The government argues that the meaning of the term 
“distribute” in § 2252(a)(2) should track the definition of 
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“distribution” set forth in the Guidelines Manual for purposes 
of the distribution enhancement under U.S.S.G. 
§ 2G2.2(b)(3). However, the definition of “distribution” 
under the Sentencing Guidelines has no bearing on the 
meaning of the term in § 2252. As the Tenth Circuit has held, 
“the statutory term has a distinct meaning and is not as broad 
as the same term under § 2G2.2(b)(3).” United States v. 
Ramos, 695 F.3d 1035, 1044 (10th Cir. 2012). “Distribution” 
under § 2G2.2(b)(3) extends to such acts as “possession with 
intent to distribute, production, advertisement, and 
transportation, related to the transfer of material involving the 
sexual exploitation of a minor.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
Manual § 2G2.2 app. n.1. In fact, “any act . . . related to the 
transfer of material involving the sexual exploitation of a 
minor” qualifies as “distribution” under § 2G2.2(b)(3). Id. 
(emphasis added). Defendants can be subject to the 
distribution enhancement even if they are not convicted of 
distributing child pornography, since the enhancement applies 
to anyone convicted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1466A, 2252, 
2252A(a)-(b), and 2260(b). See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
Manual § 2G2.2 cmt. (listing the applicable statutory 
provisions); see also United States v. Vallejos, 742 F.3d 902, 
908 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the district court properly 
applied a distribution enhancement to a defendant convicted 
of receipt of material involving the sexual exploitation of 
minors); United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d 330, 335 (4th Cir. 
2009) (upholding the application of a distribution 
enhancement to a defendant convicted of possession of child 
pornography). While several circuits have held that merely 
placing child pornography in a shared folder on a file sharing 
network warrants application of a distribution enhancement, 
no circuit has relied on the Sentencing Guidelines definition 
of “distribution” to interpret the meaning of the term in 
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§ 2252(a)(2). Because “distribute” in § 2252(a)(2) is narrower 
than the same term in § 2G2.2(b)(3), we decline to adopt the 
definition of “distribution” laid out in the Sentencing 
Guidelines.  
 
 Based on the ordinary meaning of the word 
“distribute,” the other statutory provisions criminalizing child 
pornography offenses, and the decisions of our sister circuits, 
we hold that the term “distribute” in § 2252(a)(2) requires 
evidence that a defendant’s child pornography materials were 
completely transferred to or downloaded by another person. 
Of course, knowingly placing child pornography in a shared 
folder on a file sharing network remains a criminal offense. 
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1)(A) (prohibiting offers to 
distribute child pornography); 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(1) 
(prohibiting attempted distribution). It just isn’t distribution. 
In the end, our interpretation of “distribute” in § 2252(a)(2) 
might affect the government’s charging decisions, but it does 
not handicap the government’s ability to prosecute child 
pornography offenses.  
 
C. 
 
 In this case, the government did not introduce evidence 
that anyone downloaded child pornography materials from 
Husmann’s shared folder. Price testified that a document 
entitled “/yayaohno63” and several other files containing 
child pornography were successfully loaded to a shared folder 
on 360 Share Pro. However, neither he nor any other witness 
testified that another person actually downloaded those files. 
To the contrary, Price testified that he could not verify when 
Husmann’s materials were placed within a shared folder nor 
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could he determine if the documents were “ever downloaded 
to another machine.” App. 202. 
 
 Because distribution requires a download or transfer of 
materials and because the government did not present 
evidence that Husmann distributed child pornography within 
the meaning of § 2252(a)(2), the District Court erred in 
denying Husmann’s motion for acquittal.  
 
III. 
 
 The government argues that, even if the District Court 
committed an error, it did not amount to plain error. An error 
is not “plain” if it is not “clear under current law.” United 
States v. Clark, 237 F.3d 293, 297 (3d Cir. 2001). To date, the 
Third Circuit has not ruled on the meaning of the term 
“distribute” for purposes of § 2252(a)(2). Moreover, it does 
not appear that any Article III court has addressed the precise 
question of whether “distribution” occurs without evidence of 
a download or transfer of materials. Yet the lack of case law 
on this specific question does not doom Husmann’s appeal, 
since “[n]either the absence of circuit precedent nor the lack 
of consideration of the issue by another court prevents the 
clearly erroneous application of statutory law from being 
plain error.” See United States v. Evans, 155 F.3d 245, 252 
(3d Cir. 1998).  
 
 The ordinary meaning of the word “distribute” is to 
apportion, deliver, or give out; the overall statutory scheme 
reveals that the term cannot encompass offers and attempts to 
distribute; and appellate case law indicates that distribution 
under § 2252(a)(2) requires evidence that child pornography 
materials are actually downloaded by or completely 
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transferred to another person. Taken together, the District 
Court’s error was “clear under current law.” See Clark, 237 
F.3d at 297.  
 
 Furthermore, the error affected Husmann’s substantial 
rights. Had the District Court granted Husmann’s Rule 29 
motion for acquittal as to the distribution counts in the 
indictment, Husmann not only would have been acquitted on 
the three counts of distribution, but he would have been 
subject to a lower base offense level and a reduced guideline 
range. A conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) carries a 
base offense level of 22. See U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(a)(2). By 
contrast, Husmann’s remaining conviction for possession of 
child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4), 
carries a base offense level of 18. See U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(a)(1). 
 
 Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court 
committed plain error in denying Husmann’s Rule 29 motion. 
Because “imposing a sentence not authorized by law 
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, and reputation of the 
proceedings,” we exercise our discretion and vacate 
Husmann’s conviction for distributing child pornography. See 
Evans, 155 F.3d at 252. We remand to the District Court for 
resentencing with respect to Husmann’s remaining conviction 
for possession of child pornography. Therefore, we do not 
reach Husmann’s challenges to his sentence.  
 
IV. 
 
 A jury convicted Husmann of distributing child 
pornography pursuant to § 2252(a)(2). Yet the government 
did not present evidence that Husmann’s attempts to 
distribute child pornography ever succeeded. Because 
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distribution requires a download or transfer of materials, we 
conclude that the District Court committed plain error in 
denying Husmann’s motion for acquittal. Therefore, we 
vacate his conviction under § 2252(a)(2) and remand for 
resentencing. 
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United States v. David George Husmann No. 13-2688, 
Argued March 24, 2014 
 
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 I cannot join my colleagues in the narrow definition of 
“distribution” they would apply to child pornography cases. 
George Husmann was convicted by a jury of three counts of 
distributing child pornography pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
2252(a)(2). Husmann placed images of child pornography 
into a shared folder accessible to all global users of the peer-
to-peer (“P2P”) file sharing program 360 Share Pro. Once in 
the shared folder, a search term and a click of a mouse 
allowed access to these images by any user on the system. My 
colleagues definition of “distribution,” under 18 U.S.C. § 
2252, would create a system in which a person who 
intentionally posted child pornography on the Internet, 
knowing it is accessible to hundreds, if not millions, of 
individuals, is not “distribution.” This is certainly not what 
Congress had in mind and following the majority’s approach, 
the crime of distribution would not be complete until a police 
officer downloaded the image.1 This is a distinction without 
merit. Given the plain meaning of the term, the intent of 
Congress, the advancement of technology, as well as a series 
of recent sentencing cases, the placing of child pornography 
into a shared file accessible over a peer-to-peer file sharing 
network, alone should constitute “distribution.” Husmann 
                                                 
1 This is not a strict requirement of the majority’s definition, 
however due to the inability to search third party computers, 
law enforcement officers downloading the image prior to 
arrest is most common in cases under § 2252. See e.g., United 
States v. Richardson, 713 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2013).  
 2 
 
took all the necessary steps to make a product available to the 
public in a publically accessible location, and whether or not 
a party took that product is irrelevant to both the purpose of § 
2252 and to his role as distributor. For that reason, the 
conviction of Appellant George Husmann for “distribution” 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2252 should be upheld. 
 
 As explained in my colleague’s discussion of how 
peer-to-peer networks2 operate, when a file is placed into the 
                                                 
2 Speaking to its original purpose, the Supreme Court found 
“peer-to-peer networks [were originally] employed to store 
and distribute electronic files by universities, government 
agencies, corporations, and libraries, among others.” MGM 
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 20 (2005). Peer-
to-peer programs allow users through their computers to 
communicate “directly with each other, not through central 
servers.” United States v. Caparotta, 890 F. Supp. 2d 200, 
202 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Grokster, 545 U.S. at 919-20). 
These file sharing components “combine[] two functions: the 
ability to search for and download the files from other users, 
and the ability to make files on one’s own computer available 
to other users.” Lewis, 554 F.3d at 211 (emphasis added). “A 
P2P program user can make his files accessible for browsing 
and downloading by other users by placing such files into a 
designated folder (the ‘shared folder’) that will automatically 
share its contents with the network.” Caparotta, 890 F. Supp. 
2d at 919-20 (citing United States v. Chiaradio, 684 F.3d 265, 
271 (1st Cir. 2012) (emphasis added)). “The most common 
mode of distribution today is ‘open’ P2P file-sharing.” Report 
to Congress: Federal Child Pornography Offense: Executive 
Summary, 25 Fed. Sent. R. 334, 2013 WL 8171786, at *14 
(June 1, 2013). “Open” sharing allows distribution 
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“shared” folder, it is available to anyone who has the network 
on their own computers, and readily accessible by typing in 
relevant search terms. United States v. Lewis, 554 F.3d 208, 
211 (1st Cir. 2009). “Also by default, any file a user 
downloads through [a peer-to-peer program] is automatically 
placed in that ‘Shared’ folder and is therefore offered by that 
user for further downloads by other users.” Id. Thus, a picture 
uploaded into a “shared” folder enters an expanding 
“international network of interconnected computers” and is 
available to “anyone else on the Internet” with this program.3 
                                                                                                             
“impersonal[ly] and indiscriminate[ly]” to anyone with the 
program. Id. Other types, “reflecting a significant evolution of 
technologies used to distribute child pornography . . . in the 
last decade” include “closed” programs, as well as “pure,” 
“centralized” and “hybrid” networks, differing in how and 
where a file is stored and accessed. Id.; see also Columbia 
Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1025-26 (9th 
Cir. 2013).  These programs have “changed the way typical 
offenders today receive and distribute child pornography.” 25 
Fed. Sent. R. 334, 2013 WL 8171786, at *5. Most worrying, a 
child porn distributor does not “need[] any particular 
technological expertise” and because P2P networks cut out a 
centralized server (or “middle man”), there are no records.” 
Michael J. Henzey, Going on the Offensive: A Comprehensive 
Overview of Internet Child Pornography Distribution and 
Aggressive Legal Action, 11 Appalachian J. L. 1, 50 (2011). 
As a result, peer-to-peer networks are “stimulating the supply 
in the interstate market [of] child pornography.” Adam Walsh 
Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-248, § 
501, 120 Stat. 587 (2006). 
3 Peer-to-peer sharing programs are free to the public via 
download. (App. vol. II at 199a.) 
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Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997); see also Lewis, 554 
F.3d at 211. 
  
 Key to the analysis of whether Husmann “distributed” 
the pornography by placing it into his “shared” folder is the 
type of peer-to-peer network which was used in this case. It 
was 360 Share Pro.4  360 Share Pro “utilizes the LimeWire 
network to operate.” (App. vol. II at 186a.) LimeWire, often 
involved in the relevant case law discussed within, functions 
through an open and centralized “Gnutella network,” and 
“users can share all files stored on their computers with other 
LimeWire users.” Arista Records LLC v. Lime Grp. LLC, 784 
F. Supp. 2d 398, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (“LimeWire recommends that all LimeWire 
users share generously with one another.”). Further,  
 
LimeWire then scans the computers of other 
LimeWire users, to locate files that match the 
search criteria. The LimeWire user can 
download any files that LimeWire locates. 
When the user downloads a file, LimeWire 
transfers a digital copy of the file from the 
computer on which it is located to the 
LimeWire user’s computer.  
Id. at 410-11. Thus, once a file is placed in a shared folder it 
is “uploaded,” and available to the online community. (App. 
vol. II at 203a.)  
                                                 
4 360 Share Pro is a subsidiary user of the greater LimeWire 
network. (Id. at 186a.) 
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 We must not lose sight of the nature of Husmann’s 
crime.5 Child pornography has the ability to perpetually harm 
the child posed or acted upon in the image or video. “Many 
victims live with persistent concern over who has seen images 
of their sexual abuse and suffer by knowing that their images 
are being used by offenders for sexual gratification . . . .” 25 
Fed. Sent. R. 334, 2013 WL 8171786, at *4. Once images of 
child pornography are distributed over the Internet, “it is 
impossible to eradicate all copies of [them].” Id. More 
troubling, the prevalence and pervasiveness of child 
pornography has increased dramatically in the Internet age. § 
501, 120 Stat. 587. (“The advent of the Internet has greatly 
increased the ease of transporting, distributing, receiving, and 
advertising child pornography in interstate commerce.”). 
Moreover, in subsequent findings, Congress noted “[t]he 
technological ease, lack of expense, and anonymity in 
obtaining and distributing child pornography over the Internet 
has resulted in an explosion in the multijurisdictional 
distribution of child pornography.” Prosecution—Child 
Pornography Cases, Pub. L. 110-358, § 102, 122 Stat. 4001 
(2008). The House of Representatives, in the report 
underlying the statute in question, 18 U.S.C. § 2252,6 states:  
 
These disturbing images litter the Internet and 
pedophiles can purchase, view, or exchange this 
material with virtual anonymity . . . and [the 
Internet’s] expansion . . . has led to an explosion 
                                                 
5 If the majority prevails, I implore Congress to immediately 
update 18 U.S.C. § 2252 to prevent the uploading of images 
to a peer-to-peer network by defining such action as 
“distribution.”  
6 Cited as the “Child Protection Act of 2012.”  
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in the market for child pornography, making it 
easier to create, access, and distribute these 
images of abuse.  
H.R. Rep. No. 112-638 (2012), reprinted in 2012 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 662, 663 (emphasis added).  
 
 The ease, anonymity, and virtual untraceability with 
which Husmann made child pornography globally available is 
the engine behind § 2252, and the reason that “distribute” 
should be given a broader interpretation than the majority 
gives it. In analyzing the plain meaning of the statute, we 
need not define the outer boundaries of the term 
“distribution”; rather, we need only answer the specific 
question of whether placing an image of child pornography 
into a modern day “shared” folder as part of a peer-to-peer 
network is “distribution,” as the District Court found.7  
 
 If a statutory term is undefined, we must apply the 
basic principles of statutory interpretation when analyzing the 
definition of “distribution.” See Smith v. United States, 508 
U.S. 223, 228 (1993) (“When a word is not defined by statute, 
we normally construe it in accord with its ordinary or natural 
meaning.”). First, we must determine “whether the language 
at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to 
the particular dispute in the case.” Marshak v. Treadwell, 240 
F.3d 184, 192 (3d Cir. 2001). Looking both to Black’s and 
Merriam-Webster’s dictionaries, we find the plain meaning of 
“distribute” to be: “1. To apportion; to divide among several. 
                                                 
7 The parties fail to raise the “rule of lenity,” see, e.g., United 
States v. Cheeseman, 600 F.3d 270, 276 (3d Cir. 2010), in 
their briefs on appeal and thus the issue is deemed waived.  
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2. To arrange by class or order. 3. To deliver. 4. To spread 
out; to disperse.” Black’s Law Dictionary 487 (9th ed. 2009). 
Furthermore, in construing statutes, “we must, of course, start 
with the assumption that the legislative purpose is expressed 
by the ordinary meaning of the words used.” Richards v. 
United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962). As the Supreme Court 
recognized, “reasonable statutory interpretation must account 
for both ‘the specific context in which . . . language is used’ 
and ‘the broader context of the statute as a whole.’” Util. Air 
Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014) (quoting 
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)) 
(emphasis added). Clearly the actions undertaken by 
Husmann, placing the images in a folder shared globally, 
dispersed and apportioned these images to third parties within 
the plain meaning of the statute.8  
 
 The purpose of Congress in § 2252 and prior related 
statutes was to counter the now readily available market for 
child pornography over the Internet. H.R. No. 112-638.  As 
early as 1982, the Supreme Court recognized the harmful and 
reoccurring issues created by the distribution of child 
pornography. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759-60 
(1982). “[T]he distribution network for child pornography 
must be closed if the production of material which requires 
                                                 
8 Lower courts applying this plain meaning approach have 
held the definition of “distribution” is not limited to situations 
in which someone downloads an image. See Caparotta, 890 
F. Supp. 2d at 204. (“Considering the plain meaning of 
‘distribute,’ the court finds that defendant’s placing of child 
pornography files in a shared folder accessible to others via a 
P2P program on the internet constitutes ‘distribution’ under 
Section 2252(a)(2) to persons to share and download.”). 
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the sexual exploitation of children is to be effectively 
controlled.” Id. at 759.  This trade includes the rampant use of 
peer-to-peer networks as “pedophiles use child pornography 
distribution methods other than traditional websites that are 
difficult to detect and disrupt, such as peer-to-peer 
technology.” Michael J. Henzey, Going on the Offensive: A 
Comprehensive Overview of Internet Child Pornography 
Distribution and Aggressive Legal Action , 11 Appalachian J. 
L. 1, 50 (2011) (citing Chad M.S. Steel, Child Pornography 
in Peer-to-Peer Networks, 33 Child Abuse & Neglect 560, 
560 (2008)).  
 
 The purpose of § 2252 is, amongst others, to prevent 
the repeated abuse of children used to create the pornography 
by stopping the dissemination of images over the Internet. See 
§ 501, 120 Stat. 587. Congress itself, when passing the Adam 
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 
acknowledged the market for child pornography “through 
virtually every Internet technology, including . . . peer-to-peer 
[networks.]” Id. Further, Congress found distribution to be 
paramount to the trade and further exposure of the exploited 
children, see id. (“Prohibiting the intrastate . . .  distribution . . 
. of child pornography . . . will cause some persons engaged 
in such intrastate activities to cease all such activities, thereby 
reducing both supply and demand in the interstate market for 
child pornography.”), and rested its findings on the premise 
that “[a] substantial interstate market in child pornography 
exists, including not only a multimillion dollar industry, but 
also a nationwide network of individuals openly advertising 
their desire to exploit children and to traffic [and] distribute 
child pornography with the expectation of receiving other 
child pornography in return.” Id. Contextually, one can draw 
an inference from the findings underlying this Act that the 
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prevention of Internet distribution across peer-to-peer 
networks was contemplated as part of its purpose, and that 
purpose can be addressed by not limiting the definition of the 
term “distribution.”   
 
 Additionally, “distribution” has not been defined as 
requiring a subsequent download in similar contexts,9 most 
notably the transferring of music over similar peer-to-peer 
networks in violation of copyright distribution rights. See 
Grokster, 545 U.S. at 919 (holding that “one who distributes a 
device with the object of promoting its use to infringe 
copyright . . . is liable”). “Electronic distribution on a peer-to-
peer, without license from the copyright owners, violates the 
copyright owners’ exclusive right of distribution . . . .” 
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899, 903 
(8th Cir. 2012).  
 
 Finally, the Sentencing Guidelines definition, which 
does not require a download,10 has been incorporated by a 
                                                 
9 In drug distribution cases, “distribution” has been broadly 
interpreted to include any “acts perpetrated in furtherance of a 
transfer or sale, such as arranging or supervising the delivery, 
or negotiating for or receiving the purchase price.” United 
States v. Jackson, 213 F.3d 1269, 1296 (10th Cir. 2000), 
vacated and remanded on other grounds , 531 U.S. 1038 
(2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 18 U.S.C. 
§ 841(n) (“Distribute, defined, means to sell, issue, give, 
transfer, or otherwise dispose of.”). 
10 It is noteworthy that the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines § 2G2.2, when directly addressing crimes 
committed under § 2252, has defined “distribute” in the 
broader act as  
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number of Circuits for similar crimes.11 See United States v. 
Layton, 564 F.3d 330, 335 (4th Cir. 2009) (collecting cases) 
(“We concur with the Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits 
and hold that use of a peer-to-peer file-sharing program 
constitutes ‘distribution’ for the purposes of U.S.S.G. § 
2G2.2(b)(3)(F).” (emphasis added).); see also Chiaradio, 684 
F.3d at 282 (noting “[t]he fact that the defendant did not 
actively elect to transmit those files is irrelevant” to 
distribution). Several Circuits in this context have described 
the process of placing an image into a shared folder as 
“distribution.” See, e.g., United States v. Vadnais, 667 F.3d 
1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting control over what images 
                                                                                                             
 
including possession with intent to distribute, 
production, transmission, advertisement, and 
transportation, related to the transfer of material 
involving the sexual exploitation of a minor. 
Accordingly, distribution includes posting 
material involving the sexual exploitation of a 
minor on a website for public viewing  but does 
not include the mere solicitation of such 
material by a defendant. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F) cmt. n.1 (emphasis added). 
11 Our Circuit has followed this defining course, albeit for 
“aiding and abetting the transportation of child pornography” 
in an unpublished opinion. See United States v. Schade, 318 
F. App’x 91, 94 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[W]e cannot conclude that 
the jury was unreasonable in determining from this evidence 
that Schade intentionally kept child pornography files in the 
‘My Downloads’ folder and knew that doing so would allow 
Bearshare users to access and upload them.”). 
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are shared affects distribution); Arista Records, 784 F. Supp. 
2d at 411 n.6 (describing the open and encouraged 
distribution process allowed through peer-to-peer networks). 
The Ninth Circuit, in a sentencing case, held “that ‘evidence 
of a deliberate, affirmative action of delivery’ is not required 
to sustain a conviction for distribution of child pornography 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2).” United States v. Vallejos, 742 
F.3d 902, 907 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. 
Budziak, 697 F.3d 1105, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 2012)); see also, 
e.g., United States v. McManus, 734 F.3d 315, 319 (4th Cir. 
2013) ((“[Section] 2G2.2(b)(3)(F) is a residual enhancement” 
that may be applied “when a defendant knowingly permits 
others to access and retrieve child pornography files in the 
defendant’s possession, even if he does so passively.”); 
United States v. Reingold, 731 F.3d 204, 229–30 (2d Cir. 
2013) (“[K]nowingly placing child pornography files in a 
shared folder on a peer-to-peer file-sharing network 
constitutes distribution . . . even if no one actually obtains an 
image from the folder” and “without regard to whether the 
defendant’s primary purpose in placing child pornography 
files in a file-sharing program was to receive or to distribute 
child pornography.”). 
 
 The majority misapplies the need for a download to 
create distribution, where other factual bases have greater 
merit in interpreting the definition. For example, in Shaffer, 
the Tenth Circuit, acknowledging that a law enforcement 
agent downloaded the images from a shared folder, noted that 
while the defendant “may not have actively pushed 
pornography on [peer-to-peer] users, . . . he freely allowed 
them access to his computerized stash  of images and videos 
and openly invited them to take, or download, those items.” 
472 F.3d at 1223 (emphasis added). Other Circuits, in the 
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sentencing context, have recently interpreted the statutory 
interpretation of “distribution” as, “when [a party] either 
transfers it to another person or makes it accessible to others 
through a file-sharing website or peer-to-peer network.” 
United States v. Grzybowicz, 747 F.3d 1296, 1308 (11th Cir. 
2014) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Collins, 
642 F.3d 654, 655-57 (8th Cir. 2011) (affirming a district 
court’s determination of “distribution” to only require placing 
the images in a shared folder of a peer-to-peer network and 
knowledge of how that system works).12 This is consistent 
with the technology, where users control what is in their 
shared folders, and, once removed, those images are not 
accessible to the Internet. See Vadnais, 667 F.3d at 1208-09. 
 
 Determining that placing an image of child 
pornography into a shared folder constitutes “distribution” 
would, in light of the technological advances, encompass the 
plain meaning and the purpose of § 2252. See United States v. 
C.R., 792 F. Supp. 2d 343, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 2011), overruled 
on other grounds by United States v. Reingold , 731 F.3d 204 
(2d Cir. 2013) (noting “technical advances have led to [child 
pornography’s] proliferation over the past twenty years”); see 
also 25 Fed. Sent. R. 334, 2013 WL 8171786, at *6 
(discussing “dramatic technological changes related to 
computers and the Internet over the past decade . . . which 
have changed the way typical offenders today . . . distribute 
child pornography”). 
  
 In the alternative, even if the majority’s definition of 
“distribution” is accepted, I would hold that the District Court 
                                                 
12 Husmann undertook the same action with a requisite 
knowledge of file sharing.  
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did not plainly err in denying Husmann’s Rule 29 motion to 
enter a judgment of acquittal, because the evidence was 
sufficient for the jury to find Husmann distributed child 
pornography beyond a reasonable doubt. The majority finds 
the District Court committed plain error by denying 
Husmann’s motion for acquittal on the basis that the 
government “did not present evidence that Husmann’s 
attempts to distribute child pornography ever succeeded.” 
Maj. Op. at 18. As the majority notes, because the issue of 
sufficiency of the evidence as to “distribution” was raised for 
the first time on appeal, we undertake plain error review. Id. 
at 7 n.2. Plain error review requires the Appellant to 
demonstrate: “(1) there was an error; (2) the error is clear or 
obvious; and (3) the error affected the appellant’s substantial 
rights, which in the ordinary case means it affected the 
outcome of the district court proceedings.” Id. (quoting 
United States v. Andrews, 681 F.3d 509, 517 (3d Cir. 2012)). 
Thus, it would need to be clear or obvious that the District 
Court erred in concluding that a reasonable jury could have 
found that Husmann distributed child pornography.13  
                                                 
13 It must also be noted that no objection was made when at 
trial, the District Judge charged the jury with the following 
definition of “distribution”: 
 
[T]he definition of distribution is if you find the 
defendant knowingly placed images into the 
sharing folder of a file sharing program, and if 
you find that the defendant knew that placing 
the files in that folder allowed others to gain 
access to his folder and download those images 
you may find the defendant guilty of 
distribution.  
 14 
 
 Despite Husmann’s present claims to the contrary, the 
testimony elicited could have allowed a rational jury to find 
Husmann guilty for distributing child pornography. Jurors can 
make reasonable inferences which naturally rise from the 
evidence. See Ansell v. Green Acres Contracting Co., 347 
F.3d 515, 525 (3d Cir. 2003). First, the jury could have 
reasonably found Husmann uploaded the pornography into a 
shared folder.14 Second, the jury could have found beyond a 
                                                                                                             
 
(App. vol. II at 389a.) 
14 Ample evidence was provided by the Government proving 
Husmann uploaded the images. F.B.I. Forensic Agent Price 
then testified the images uploaded by Husmann onto this 
system were “shared.”  
 
[ATTORNEY:] So looking at this document 
here, can you tell if this [file] was actually 
distributed and then uploaded? 
[AGENT PRICE:] Yes, it is being shared by the 
360 Share Pro for the online community to 
download. 
[ATTORNEY:] Do you have an expert opinion 
whether that was successfully uploaded? 
[AGENT PRICE:] I do. 
 
(App. vol. II at 202a.) The testimony concluded with 
confirmation the child pornography uploaded onto the file 
sharing network was being “shared.” The thumb drive 
contained images found in a folder titled “Artpics5.” (Id. at 
264a.) These same pictures were found shared in 360 Share 
Pro in a folder called “Adorablecuties.” (Id. at 261a, 264a.) 
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reasonable doubt that at least one of the many users with the 
file sharing program downloaded the images Husmann made 
globally available. This testimony included descriptions of 
the global accessibility of peer-to-peer networks and the 
contents of the shared folders: 
 
[AGENT PRICE:] [LimeWire and 360 Share 
Pro] are programs that are termed as peer-to-
peer sharing programs where there is no 
centralized computer where the information is 
stored. 
 Basically, anybody on the internet who 
has access to the software can share files and 
folders amongst all of the different users in the 
world. It is a peer-to-peer system, there is not 
centralized storage system of the files. 
                                                                                                             
Agent Price testified these images were uploaded onto 360 
Share Pro from a thumb drive. 
 
[ATTORNEY:] [Y]ou can tell that this file is 
uploaded on 360 Share Pro? 
[AGENT PRICE:] Yes, it is being shared to the 
online community. 
[ATTORNEY:] On [Husmann’s] computer? 
[AGENT PRICE:] Yes 
[ATTORNEY:] And in your expert opinion it 
was actually successful? 
[AGENT PRICE:] Yes.  
 
(Id. at 203a.) 
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(App. vol. II at 185a-186a (emphasis added).) He further 
testified about the purpose of uploading an image: 
 
[AGENT PRICE:] [Images are] being shared by 
the 360 Share Pro for the online community to 
download. 
(Id. at 202a.) Finally, Agent Price testified that the specific 
images were available for download through the peer-to-peer 
network: 
 
[ATTORNEY:] Can you tell [if] this image was 
ever actually successfully uploaded? 
[AGENT PRICE:] Yes. 
. . . . 
[ATTORNEY:] And do you have a professional 
opinion as to whether this was successfully 
uploaded onto the internet? 
[AGENT PRICE:] Yes. 
. . . . 
[I]t was shared for all people to view and 
download. 
(Id. at 218a-219a (emphasis added).)  
 Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is met by the 
“prosecution persuad[ing] the factfinder ‘beyond a reasonable 
doubt’ of the facts necessary to establish all elements of the 
offense.” United States v. Vazquez, 271 F.3d 93, 125 (3d Cir. 
2001) (citing Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277–78 
(1993)). Furthermore, the government, as verdict winner, is 
entitled to “the benefit of all reasonable inferences capable of 
being drawn therefrom, and an . . . interpret[ation of] the 
evidence in the light most favorable to [it].” Hahn v. Atl. 
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Richfield Co., 625 F.2d 1095, 1099 (3d Cir. 1980) (citing 
Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 
690, 696 (1962)). Review of the record suggests enough 
evidence was presented to allow the jury to find Husmann 
guilty of a distribution crime that included the majority’s 
requirement of a download. The District Court did not 
“clear[ly] or obvious[ly]” err in denying Husmann’s motion 
for acquittal. In sum, the evidence presented could have 
allowed a rational jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that Husmann uploaded the images into his shared 
folder, made images of child pornography available to a 
global audience, and that at least one member of Husmann’s 
global network downloaded them, thus “distributing” child 
pornography as charged by the District Court. 
  
 At bottom, I find the majority’s definition of 
“distribution” to be overly narrow in regards to the plain 
meaning and purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 2252, or, in the 
alternative, find the District Court did not commit plain error 
because a rational jury could have found that a third party 
downloaded the accessible pornography. Thus, for the 
aforementioned reasons, I respectfully dissent.   
